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Integration, Class and Secularism: The Marginalization of Shia Identities in 
the UK Iranian Diaspora 
 
Abstract 
Despite ongoing debates about the nature and role of multiculturalism in the UK, the idea of 
integration remains significant in British immigration policies and community relations, and it 
orients itself towards second and third-generation diasporans as well as recent arrivals. Drawing 
on original data from the UK Iranian diaspora, this paper aims to complicate extant debates by 
exploring the cultural dimensions of integration mainly at the intra-diasporic level. Particularly 
among secular middle-class UK Iranians, ‘integration’ acts as an idiom for being a ‘good’, 
‘successful’, ‘proper’ Iranian, and a failure to integrate is often described as unacceptable and 
even shameful. Integration in this sense mirrors dominant neo-liberal attitudes and puts huge 
pressure on Iranians to constantly ‘do better’ in cultural and economic terms to justify their 
presence in the UK. Crucially, these processes are predicated on a critique and/or rejection of 
Iranian Shiism and Islam in general, thus helping to marginalize Iranian Shia identities in 
representations of Iranian-ness in the British mainstream. We argue, therefore, that dominant 
policies and discourses of integration, regardless of their stated intention, intersect with the 
multiple and competing realities that exist in a diasporic community to produce particular social 
and cultural relations which may exclude identities protected under UK law. However, we also 
draw comparison with the US to suggest that these dynamics might begin to change in the near 
future. 
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British-Iranians, integration, Shiism, diaspora, secularism, multiculturalism  
 
Introduction: the integration debate 
Although the UK does not have a blanket integration policy to address the various categories of 
its immigrants, the idea of integration nonetheless has a continuous and significant presence in 
British politics and community relations. As such, the discourse of integration orients itself 
towards the descendants of immigrants as much as it is aimed at recent arrivals. In Britain, 
integration has broadly been thought of as a set of civic processes whose aim is to render 
unproblematic social differences such as religion and ethnicity (Modood 2012). On the whole, 
British integration policies, such as the Race Relations Acts, have been informed by a 
commitment to multiculturalism. A mainstay of British politics especially in the latter half of the 
twentieth century, multiculturalism fell out of favour with the political establishment in Britain 
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and much of Europe in the early part of this century. Despite that, Meer and Modood (2014) 
argue that the category to which the term refers continues to be highly robust and relevant. Be 
that as it may, as Wieviorka (2014: 637) has suggested, the idea of integration has today become 
more or less synonymous with the question of whether or not immigrants will ‘disrupt’ Western 
societies. This is backed up by a recent study in the UK which shows that although the various 
communities that make up British society share many common values, integration is nevertheless 
portrayed as an ‘immigrant problem’, with no clear definition of integration provided by the 
government (Lessard-Phillips and Galandini 2015). It should also be noted that the dominant 
discourse of integration has in recent years disproportionately addressed, indeed problematized, 
working-class and non-white immigrants, as well as Britain’s Muslim populations irrespective of 
the length of their settlement.1 The problematization of Muslims (or those perceived as Muslims) 
has further taken place through the introduction of the notion of ‘British values’, which Muslims 
are generally thought to lack (Jarvis et al. 2017; see also Kundnani 2007). That is also why 
questions of integration and British citizenship have become so tightly entwined with issues of 
(Muslim) religious and (Western) secular identity.  
This fraught context frames the salient debates around integration, Britishness and citizenship. In 
August 2017, for example, an All-Party Parliamentary Group (APPG) chaired by Labour MP 
Chuka Umunna published a report that repeated the need to better integrate the UK’s migrant 
populations (APPG 2017). This time, however, there was an acknowledgement that post-Brexit 
demonization of migrants is acting as a barrier to integration, a rather rare divergence from the 
usual rhetoric of blaming immigrant communities for ‘failing to integrate’. A key theme in the 
APPG’s approach to integration is the idea of British citizenship, which is reframed as way for 
immigrants to demonstrate belonging to Britain. The APPG also uses the notion of ‘pathways to 
citizenship’ to effectively position all immigrants as citizens-in-waiting. This approach rests on 
the assumption that the pathway to citizenship is a smooth one and that British citizenship is 
desirable, perhaps even necessary, in becoming integrated. It also assumes that the difficult 
questions around the recognition of minority cultures versus assimilation have been definitively 
answered.  
                                                            
1 See for example: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/parsons‐green‐radicalisation‐british‐muslims‐austerity‐
middle‐east‐a7957766.html (accessed 30/07/2018) 
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What the current debate fails to appreciate, however, is the complexity and multi-dimensionality 
of integration as a definite set of social and political practices with wide-reaching powers. 
Particularly, little attention has been paid to its cultural dimensions, as well as the fact that 
dominant policies and discourses operate differently within different immigrant communities. 
We argue here that there are multiple and competing discourses, pragmatics and cultures of 
integration within a given immigrant (or ethnic minority) community. These intersect in 
important ways with diasporic dynamics of class, religiosity and secularity and have implications 
for processes of identity formation/assertion as well as social, political and religious/secular 
practice. By the same token we also draw attention to the ways in which dominant British 
integration policies and debates – well-intentioned though they may be – can transform 
immigrant communities by privileging some identities and modes of belonging over others. 
Paradoxically, in some cases the de-privileged identities are ones already protected under the 
UK’s Equality Act 2010, such as religious identities.  
Drawing on recent research data from the UK Iranian diaspora, this paper aims to complicate the 
debate by exploring the cultural dimensions of integration at the intra-diasporic level. Among 
many UK Iranians, particularly secular middle-class professionals, integration increasingly acts 
as an idiom for being a ‘good’, ‘successful’, ‘proper’ Iranian, and a failure to integrate is seen as 
unacceptable and even shameful. As we will see, the impetus for integration among these 
Iranians derives from what can be described as a sense of inferiority steeped in a Eurocentric 
mentality which exerts huge pressure on Iranians to ‘do better’ in cultural and economic terms 
and to constantly justify their adequacy and presence in the UK. Among some Iranians, there is a 
strong narrative that successful integration can only happen by adopting a particular lifestyle – 
one which emphasises neo-liberal ideals of success and power through education and 
consumerism – thus explicitly or implicitly reinforcing the perceived superiority of Western 
civilization and the inferiority of Iranian Islamic culture. An important outcome of these 
processes is the sense of Iranian integration being sui generis, producing a weakness of 
‘solidarity’ with other minority groups in a socially-progressive politics. Another outcome is the 
increasing marginalization in popular diasporic Iranian culture and social relations of Shia 
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identities and practices.2 We focus here mostly on the latter. However, we also draw some 
comparisons with the US to suggest how the UK situation might change in the near future. 
‘Integration’ among UK Iranians 
It is difficult to have any sort of understanding of Iranian diasporic living without first 
understanding the role and impact of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution. The particular events, 
discourses and currents of the revolution, their histories and subsequent developments, have all 
played a crucial role in defining Iranians’ migratory, settlement and integration practices across 
the world. Arguably, no factor was more central during the revolution than Shiism, which proved 
highly effective in unifying and mobilizing against the Shah what were otherwise disparate 
revolutionary forces (Keddie 2003). For around half a century leading up to the revolution, Iran 
had been steadily undergoing a systematic and sometimes violent regime of secularization and 
Westernization. It had also witnessed high levels of social inequality and political 
authoritarianism. These all but guaranteed the potency and popular appeal of Shiism as not only 
a religious but also a socio-political force. It was therefore espoused by Iranians from an array of 
social and political backgrounds including some secular intellectuals. A popular analysis of 
Iran’s cultural diminution was provided in Al-Ahmad’s (1962/1984) argument about 
‘Westoxification’ or ‘Occidentosis’ (gharbzadegi), which has remained a trope in contemporary 
Iranian discourses under the Islamic Republic. However, as the post-revolutionary dynamics 
took a decidedly Islamic turn and established an Islamic theocracy in place of the monarchy, 
many previously supportive parties, factions and individuals turned once again into oppositional 
voices. A discourse and political agency began to develop, contributed to by royalists among 
other groups, that expressed nostalgia for the Shah’s secular Iran, including his favoured tropes 
of ancient Persia and its imperial might. As such, since the revolution, the event which also 
precipitated the largest exodus in Iran’s history, Shiism has been at the very core of the contested 
notions of Iranian identity, culture, social organization and politics (see Milani 2018; Gholami 
2015). What might be described as an Iranian ‘third way’ between repressive monarchy and 
                                                            
2 Due to space limitations, the article will not focus on the particularities of devout Iranian Shia identities and 
practices. 
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repressive theocracy - a more democratic, secular and progressive orientation –  was quashed 
before and after the revolution, although it limps on both inside Iran and in diaspora.3 
It is perhaps not surprising given this history that the Iranian diaspora is widely acknowledged to 
be a predominantly secular one, especially in the US and the UK (Gholami 2015; Spellman 
2004).4 However, this secularism is often of a particular kind – it has unique characteristics. In 
his research on Iranian diasporic secularism, Gholami has shown that it takes particular issue 
with Islam, implicitly and explicitly problematizing, marginalizing and ridiculing ‘the Islamic’. 
He has called this modality of the secular ‘non-Islamiosity’ (Gholami 2015). In its more extreme 
guise, non-Islamiosity, which works across classes and generations and has come to be practised 
by later immigrants as well, aims to purge what it sees as a pure Iranian/Persian identity, culture 
and language from Islamic influences. This is often done through a glorification of Iran’s pre-
Islamic history, especially the Persian empire (sixth century BCE – seventh century CE). The 
iconography of Zoroastrianism as a ground for an ancient Iranian identity has also gained some 
popular traction, although practising adherents inside Iran have had a difficult time. At the level 
of everyday living, for many diasporic Iranians the various levels of non-Islamiosity constitute a 
mechanism of self-making that allows them to carve out specific social and experiential spaces in 
which certain modalities of selfhood – those believed to have been curtailed by Islam – can be 
(re)constructed and lived. In this way, non-Islamiosity is individually and socially 
transformative, shaping discourses and sensibilities. As such, it also has a considerable impact on 
Shia religious practices, identities and experiences. Thus, devout Shia experience and practice is 
often shaped in a dialogic relationship with non-Islamiosity (Gholami 2015). That is, Iranian 
diasporic Shiism cannot be understood or studied without reference to non-Islamiosity as a 
diasporic secular mode of power.   
To add to this complexity is the re-emergence of Sunni-Shia antagonisms at the international 
level, most evidently framed by the competition for regional hegemony between Saudi Arabia 
(an extreme manifestation of Wahhabi Sunnism) and Shia Iran. In Britain, the distinction 
between different branches of Islam is poorly understood and even less apparent in public 
discourses about Islam; any differentiation mainly develops in parallel with international issues 
                                                            
3 Although its political composition and aims were very complex, the Green Movement of 2009 can be seen as an 
example of this.  
4 It should be noted that there are also Iranian Jews, Christians and Bahais, though research on them is scarce. 
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such as the conflict in Syria. But Shiis are in the minority within British Islam. An on-line guide 
suggests that ‘at least 96% of Muslims in Britain, and approximately 1520 or 96% of masjids or 
mosques, are Sunni, and about 2% are Shi’a, with 67 masjids.’ (MuslimsInBritain.org). The 
recent controversy about the re-development of Golders Green Hippodrome in north-west 
London into a Muslim cultural centre seems to be oblivious of the fact that this will be Shia. 
What is more, Iranians tend to keep to themselves even within the Shia minority. For instance, 
the London Shia Muslims Hub5 is predominantly South Asian in ethnicity, with no sign of 
Iranian participation. Furthermore, neither ‘Iranian’ nor ‘Shia’ are categories in the UK census 
nor used officially by the UK government.  
The Iranian diasporic culture of integration that is the focus of this paper must, first of all, be 
seen within the historical, migratory and UK contexts briefly sketched out above (see also 
Sreberny and Gholami in press). This means that the particularities of the revolution, Shiism, 
secularism, the UK context and their continued instrumentality in shaping Iranian living at every 
level must be accounted for. Secondly, the influence of Western cultures and trends cannot be 
underestimated: the glorification of pre-Islamic Persia that so readily animates dominant secular 
discourses among diasporic Iranians does not only happen through a problematization and 
exclusion of Iran’s Islamic history; it is also intimately entwined with certain understandings of 
Western attitudes and cultures, as we show below. In the UK setting, the particularities of the 
Conservative Party’s austerity economics and the rhetorics of new entrepreneurialism are key. 
The professionalized discourse of ‘success’, with its emphasis on high educational and 
professional achievements, individual wealth and neo-liberal consumerism – and having access 
to political power through these – stand out. In sum, we argue based on our data (see below) that 
among UK Iranians the idea of integration is dominated by secular middle-class discourses and is 
articulated in a way which: 
i. ties integration unproblematically to neo-liberalized modes of educational, economic and 
political activity; 
ii. makes it unacceptable for Iranians not to integrate on those terms; 
                                                            
5 A meet-up located at http://bit.ly/2y6qFUX (accessed 10/10/2017)  
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iii. generally accepts British socio-political structures as given, even righteous, and does not 
problematize or critique them, thus also absolving the British government of any 
responsibility towards its minority populations; 
iv. implicitly and explicitly problematizes and excludes Islam/Shiism while seeing it as an 
obstacle for Iranian success; 
v. obscures any possible solidarity with other Shia groups and other UK Muslims;  
vi. obscures any possible solidarity with non-white minorities in general.  
Our research project and findings 
Below, we will examine how these issues play out institutionally. However, let us first illustrate 
the above arguments through interview data collected in London between 2014-2015 as part of a 
mixed-methods research project funded by the British Council.6 In total, 30 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted with UK-based Iranians, 13 males and 17 females aged between 22-
60+. The interviews were transcribed and thematically analysed; we have discussed other major 
interview themes elsewhere (see Sreberny and Gholami 2016). The interviewees were secular 
middle-class professionals and were recruited through purposive snowball sampling. They were 
also all either British citizens or permanent residents of the UK. We asked them about their 
views on and modes of participation in ‘Iranian communities’ in Britain, as well as wider issues 
of belonging and integration.7 Quite often, there was a self-deprecating sort of sensibility that 
seems to be largely structured by, and reproductive of, the discourse and logic of integration 
discussed above. 
We first became interested in the issue of integration when one of our interviewees (male, 31-45) 
described what he saw as his mother’s failure to integrate as ‘tragic and shameful’ because after 
30 years in Britain she still wore a headscarf and did not speak English ‘properly’. Such severely 
negative language is indicative of the pressure some middle-class Iranians feel to distance 
themselves and their familial and social circles from dominant images of Muslims and the 
Middle East and make themselves more acceptable to British culture. Integration, then, is 
primarily understood and approached in cultural terms. For our interviewee, integration was not 
mainly about one’s civic and economic contributions to British society such as voting, paying 
                                                            
6 The project was led by Professor Sreberny. 
7 For a more detailed discussion, see Sreberny and Gholami 2016. 
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taxes and upholding the law. He also seemed to disregard the UK’s championing of 
multiculturalism, which includes allowing people to dress in accordance with their 
religious/cultural customs. Moreover, he accused his mother of not speaking English properly, 
which suggests that being integrated requires a specific level, and possibly style, of English. 
Again, this is not an explicit part of government or public-sector policy but is something that 
some overseas recruiters such as the National Health Service (NHS) or universities can 
determine based on their needs. The government does require some migrants to demonstrate 
basic English skills upon applying for a visa and to show that they have improved on those skills 
within a certain time period; there are also some language requirements for naturalizing as a 
British citizen, though there is an on-going political debate about whether to require and provide 
resources for immigrants’ language competency. However, all these rules are relatively recent8 
and certainly do not require advanced levels of proficiency. We have here, then, a good example 
of how dominant discourse/policy takes on a life of its own within a migrant/diasporic 
community and lends itself to the production of new discourses, cultures and relations. That is, 
what may be simply intended as a set of policy statements/practices that wholly make sense in 
the majority culture produces a range of (unintended) pressures and dynamics within migrant 
communities.  
A crucial point here is that migrants do not engage with each of the policies and discourses that 
address them separately. Rather, it is more accurate to think of a comprehensive, if complex, 
‘field’ of policies and discourses that are a constant and powerful presence in their lives, 
regardless of length of settlement in the UK or citizenship status, exactly because the field is 
highly racialized and religified. In terms of the focus of this paper, although religious 
belief/practice is not officially highlighted as a barrier to integration but is in fact protected under 
UK law, it is nonetheless seen by many Iranians as a distinct marker of a failure to integrate. This 
is in no small part due to rising levels of Islamophobia in the West today, which is steadily 
gaining acceptance in mainstream debates as well. As such, the issue of Islam also affects 
Iranians’ social relationships/networks as well as how they engage with their own community. 
Thus, for some people, ensuring that they are part of a secular social circle is paramount, not 
                                                            
8 For example, the ‘improvement’ requirement known as the A2 test took effect in 2017. 
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least for achieving integration and being seen to have integrated. According to another of our 
interviewees (male, 46-60): 
There are beliefs that [some Iranians] carry with them over years and years and years 
even if there is no real root for it or real reason for it to be carried out. But people believe 
in that, it is more of a, yeah, superstitious idea. That’s how religion is now in most of the 
Iranian people. And I still see families, women, men with those thoughts and because I 
don’t believe in any of that I feel myself disconnected from that. 
Interviewer: Okay. And, like, this disconnect that you have with the Iranian community – 
does it not make your life isolated? Or do you have different means of connecting with 
Iranian people? 
I have different means because I have friends who think… who are on the same level of 
me, and they are Iranian and I have, uh, loads of Europeans friends, non-Iranians 
friends… So no, if I find somebody who is thinking the same way as me I can easily 
connect. So, um… it doesn’t bother me. I don’t feel a hole in my life, not being 
connected to the Iranian communities. 
This man, then, would not establish a relationship with anyone who still holds Islamic beliefs, 
choosing instead to connect with people who are ‘on his level’. In his cultural framework, 
therefore, connection to other Iranians or an Iranian community was not seen as very important. 
Rather, social relationships were driven primarily by compatibility of secular beliefs. This raises 
two important points. First, the idea that has gained purchase in some quarters of British politics 
since the publication of the Cantle Report in 20019 that (non-white, Muslim) migrant 
communities choose to segregate themselves from the rest of society is shown here to be 
inaccurate. In the case of middle-class Iranians, intra-communal links can be extremely weak as 
individuals seek relationships based on life-style or belief compatibility. Second, the emphasis 
that many Iranians place on secularity has a marginalizing effect on Iranian Shia identities. This 
                                                            
9 This report was commissioned by the UK government in response to so-called ‘race riots’ in some northern 
English towns, which Cantle blamed on the ‘self-segregation’ of ethnic minority communities. The report had a 
significant impact on UK policy and helped to usher in the ‘community cohesion’ agenda which saw sweeping 
changes in the UK’s naturalization and citizenship processes.  
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is because secular discourse is not neutral towards religiosity but rather positions it negatively 
and actively seeks to exclude it, as we saw in the quote above.   
The marginalization of Muslim/Shia identities happens alongside a valorization of the practices 
of the state and the majority population. As alluded to earlier, this often manifests in the idea that 
Iranians must not be a burden on Britain. Interviewees often expressed strong views about this 
and felt shame and embarrassment at the thought of potentially bothering their ‘hosts’. 
Concomitantly, they expect all Iranians, even those born in Britain, to be continually grateful to 
Britain and recognise its magnanimity. This might involve taking blame even when there is no 
evidence that one has done anything wrong. As one woman put it: 
Our community and cultural celebrations such as Nowrooz, Sizdebedar and 
Chaharshanbe Soori all seem to have a significant amount of police present. This is 
incredibly embarrassing. Why don’t they allow us to have barbeques on days like this? I 
believe this is partly our fault, as we may have given off a bad image and come across as 
violent. I don’t think this is true, but a few fights here and there have led the police to 
believe this. I believe that we should help ourselves. The government here is fair and they 
do not owe us anything! (Female, 46-60) 
There is in the quote above almost a temptation to criticise the misrepresentation of Iranians as 
violent and to register a complaint that barbeques are not allowed. However, the interviewee 
quickly changes direction and reluctantly holds Iranians responsible for giving off a negative 
image. As with the previous viewpoints, the theme of embarrassment is also present here, 
especially as the cultural celebrations cited – because they are pre-Islamic celebrations and take 
place in open public spaces – are seen by many Iranians as an opportunity to ‘showcase’ the 
compatibility and comparability of Iranian and British cultures.   
It is also noteworthy that this respondent described the state as fair and stopped short of making 
any demands for special consideration, even as British governments have been known to grant 
special dispensation to accommodate some minority groups (e.g. exempting Sikhs from wearing 
safety helmets at work). Importantly, this relates to the fact that middle-class Iranians often do 
not want to be seen to be so different as to require special dispensation. Many are quite happy to 
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assimilate fully to the dominant culture, which helps to further marginalize and problematize 
Shia religious and/or cultural identities and practices.  
However, some Iranians approach the issue of integration more pragmatically, with many 
recognizing that being integrated, or being seen to have integrated, is useful for achieving 
financial and professional success. As a PhD student at a respected UK university said: ‘By 
integrating yourself to the system and not seeing yourself as an outsider you can open the door 
for success.’ In this context, not seeing oneself as an outsider is about more than self-perception; 
it is about ensuring that there is plenty of distance between one’s identity/image as an integrated 
Iranian and the negative images associated with non-white, especially Muslim, migrants as well 
as with the current Iranian regime. 
However, the same person said: 
I’d like to one day obtain my British passport in order to live here indefinitely, however 
I’ll still call myself an Iranian with a British passport. Let’s put it this way, if I was from 
one of the EU countries, I wouldn’t apply for a British passport, though I would choose to 
stay in Britain and not my country of origin. So the only reason to have a British passport 
for me is due to the fact that my own Iranian passport is very weak and not only here but 
unfortunately globally, at this stage one of the weakest passports to hold. (Female, 31-45) 
Interestingly, then, despite seeing integration as important for success, becoming a British citizen 
was not seen as a necessary step towards integration. The ability to vote, for example, was not a 
priority for this interviewee. Rather, integration referred to a particular set of cultural and 
economic behaviours that are meant to guarantee economic success and social acceptance. Yet, 
even such a pragmatic approach is in part driven by the emphasis in dominant discourse and 
policy that ‘good migrants’ are economically useful and make an effort not to be too culturally 
alien. That said, this conception of integration is markedly different than the one espoused by the 
APPG, as described above in the introduction. 
Institutional Marginalization 
There is evidence that the marginalization of Shia identities is also happening institutionally in 
the Iranian diaspora. For example, in mainstream Iranian supplementary schools in the UK, the 
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Islamic aspects of Iranian history and culture are generally not focussed upon in the curriculum. 
The emphasis is much more on ‘doing well’ and being successful in British society by achieving 
good grades. The tacit understanding seems to be that Islamic culture offers little utility and 
cultural capital.10  
The same is true of some community organisations that purport to represent UK Iranians. Take 
for example BICDO Youth, all the more interesting because it directly addresses young British-
Iranians. Its parent organisation, the British Iranian Community Development Organisation 
(BICDO), has ambitions of being the primary voice of UK Iranians, a sort of go-between 
representing and empowering ‘Iranians’ in ‘British society’, including in Britain’s ‘corridors of 
power’.11 We have put ‘Iranian’ and ‘British society’ in inverted commas because BICDO 
defines them in quite exclusive ways in line with the context outlined above. This also means 
that ‘development’, a key word in the organisation’s name, comes to denote something very 
particular.  
The landing page of BICDO Youth’s website shows the organization’s logo followed by the 
strap line: ‘One Identity. One Community. One Future,’ written in large letters across the top of 
the page. Apart from anything else, this contrasts strongly with the picture painted of a 
fragmented and internally diverse ‘community’, divided by religion (including Bahai, Jews and 
Armenians), political affiliations, age and class, as noted by many participants in our project 
(Authors, 2016). Below this is a rolling slideshow of photographs depicting ‘Iranian culture’, 
including a well-known image from Persepolis; needless to say there is nothing Islamic on the 
landing page. Browsing through the various pages of the site, one is repeatedly presented with 
messages, photos, videos and projects offering what the organization calls ‘an insight into 
Iranian culture’. Cultural practices such as ‘charshanbeh souri’,12 tying Iran’s contemporary 
popular culture to its pre-Islamic past, have short films dedicated to them along with other 
aspects of mass culture like lavashak, a fruit roll snack. Again, as with the landing page, Iran’s 
Islamic history and heritage are conspicuously absent. In fact, ‘Iranian culture’ seems to be 
represented exclusively through the pre-Islamic and distinctly non-Islamic aspects of 
                                                            
10 For a more in-depth analysis of Iranian supplementary schools, see Gholami 2017. 
11 BICDO’s mission statement can be found on its website (http://www.bicdo.org/ or 
https://www.facebook.com/BicdoYouth/ Accessed 18/11/2017). As part of our project we also interviewed several 
senior staff, including the Director, who expressed these aims.  
12 An annual fire festival anticipating Nowruz, the Iranian New Year.   
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contemporary life – this despite the fact that BICDO Youth describes as one of its key aims to 
‘showcase our heritage in as many ways as possible’ and intends for its representation of Iranian 
culture to act as an ‘educational tool to try and correct misconceptions about Iran and its people’ 
(our emphasis).  
In keeping with its commitment to carve out ‘one identity, one community, one future’ for UK 
Iranians, the website clearly aims to present a particular image of Iran and Iranians, one that is 
more palatable for Western audiences and compatible with their ideas of a non-threatening 
‘exotic’ culture. Putting distance between Iranian-ness and Islam seems to be a crucial strategy 
for achieving that aim. By the same token, BICDO Youth also tries to show ‘the Iranian 
community’ (or the imminently uniting Iranian community) as one which is well-integrated, 
ambitious, dynamic and generally on the same economic and political wavelength as mainstream 
(arguably middle-class) Britain. As such, the organisation is at pains to show its members and 
collaborators engaged in important activities such as speaking at the Houses of Parliament and 
interacting with Members of Parliament. It also offers biographical information about its senior 
managers: young, stylish, high-achieving British-Iranians who have glittering futures ahead of 
them in finance, law and other high-prestige professions. In this way, we are also presented with 
the ideal image of British-Iranian youth whose task is to clear up ‘misconceptions’ about 
Iranians, make ‘us’ more popular and respectable, gain the community recognition and 
eventually exert influence at the highest echelons of British society.  
It is clear that constructs such as ‘Iranian’, ‘British society’ and ‘development’ are being defined 
and invoked in quite distinctive and exclusive ways by BICDO Youth. As for ‘Iranian’, any 
Iranian person who does not possess or display the characteristics propounded by the 
organization is potentially guilty of peddling the kind of misconceptions BICO Youth are 
fighting. The organization thus makes it incumbent upon Iranians to be less ‘Muslim’ and instead 
to embrace the cultural, political and professional ethos of Britain. However, Britain itself is also 
defined very narrowly: the emphasis on high academic and professional achievement, especially 
as a way to secure wealth and power, is typically associated with middle-class attitudes, 
particularly those of a conservative political persuasion. As such, far from seeing Iranians as any 
sort of critical or progressive voice in Britain or sharing any concerns with other migrant 
populations, Muslim or otherwise, their integration becomes a way to bolster and reproduce the 
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dominant economic and political structures of Britain. As we will see below, this is tied to an 
underlying belief that as a foreign minority, Iranians must not do anything that may upset their 
hosts; they should in fact largely assimilate and then do as well as they can within the limits set 
by the host society. The idea of development, finally, gains meaning in this context. ‘Community 
development’ comes to refer to social, political, economic and cultural activities that emanate 
from and reproduce neo-liberal, secular, West-centric structures and discourses within diasporic 
Iranian settings. BICDO is effectively aiming to (re)create Iranians in the British Conservative 
Party’s dominant image.  
It is important to bear in mind that organizations like BICDO see and advertise themselves as 
Iranian pure and simple – i.e. representing what is supposedly normally, universally Iranian. The 
authority to self-represent in this manner is derived in part from the belief that their highly 
secular position and identity make them easily compatible with mainstream British society and 
therefore make them well-integrated and acceptable. It also clearly differentiates them from other 
non-white and Muslim populations that are often problematized in debates about extremism and 
terrorism. In their efforts to show the community to be well-integrated, Iranian organizations are 
not placing any serious demands on the British government and wider society for special 
recognition. Religion is generally perceived as a minority affair that religious groups are 
responsible for and which does not and cannot affect the ‘mainstream’ Iranian community. In 
this way, the process of Shia marginalization/exclusion is also becoming an integral aspect of 
diasporic Iranian institutional behaviour.  
A caveat about media representation 
The one area of British social life about which Iranians do voice considerable concern is the 
general media representation of Iranians. Overall, there is little understanding or representation 
in the media of the different interpretive communities within Islam. Indeed, British Muslims 
have had to work hard to not be seen as a single homogenous community. Over the past few 
years, the politics of the Middle East has triggered somewhat crude media discussions about the 
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Sunni-Shia divide, with suggestions that the latter are ‘winning’ in the region,13 or presenting this 
as ‘Islam’s age-old schism.’14 
Respondents in our study thought British news media images represented them as fanatical and 
removed from the modernized world.  One young woman respondent expressed her concern 
thus: 
I would say that the main challenge [for Iranians] is negative media coverage. 
Stereotypes, you know, things to do with nuclear weapons, how Iranian women are 
oppressed, how we’re fanatical Muslims who self-mutilate during Ashura, that we all 
chant ‘death to the West’, that kind of stuff. These stereotypes are most definitely not 
representative of the whole nation or our people. It’s just Western misconceptions and 
misinterpretations. 
This repetitive coverage was seen to produce racist attitudes and stigma that challenged Iranians’ 
sense of being integrated. As another young woman complained, there is ‘an ongoing challenge 
for us Iranians in Britain in trying to educate or show others that not all Iranians are fanatical 
Islamists who hate Britain and America’. Many Iranians clearly feel hailed as Muslims and that 
they are included in the general exclusionary rhetoric that prevails. It is possibly the only issue 
where Iranians share and articulate similar concerns with other Muslim minority groups in 
Britain yet one where again Iranians appear to manifest a blindness to the wider Islamophobia 
that prevails in society and a lack of solidarity with other Muslims.  
US parallels in the politicization of identities 
It is instructive to look, albeit briefly, at the Iranian experience in the US for the similarities and 
differences it highlights. There is by now a considerable public political debate in the US that 
parallels the issues we have been exploring in regards to Britain. We mentioned above that the 
most recent British census did not offer the possibility of recognizing a specific Iranian identity. 
Neither does the US census. However, in 2010 there was a vigorous campaign to encourage 
Iranian-Americans to indicate their race as ‘other’ – which is to say ‘non-white’ - and to write in 
an explicit identity as Iranian, Iranian-American or Middle Eastern. This represented a 
considerable shift from the first generation of Iranian-American migrants who did not wish to 
                                                            
13 See for example: https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/the-shiites-are-winning-in-the-middle-east-and-its-all-
thanks-to-russia-a7197081.html (accessed 30/07/2018) 
14 https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16047709 (accessed 30/07/2018) 
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claim any difference from majority white America, much like the UK Iranians whom we have 
described. This could be in response to an increase in anti-Iranian sentiments in wider American 
society: a recent US study has found that Iranians are acutely aware of these sentiments and 
experience them in their lives (see Paige et al. 2015). Moreover, Iranians are often singled out 
specifically in the US, possibly due to the historically fraught relationship between Iran and 
America (ibid). Although this is not the case in the UK, Iranians’ objective and perceived 
stigmatization is an important parallel.  
There are other issues worth considering in this regard. Tehranian’s analysis of the phenomenon 
of ‘whitewashing’ Middle Eastern minorities in the US suggests that this orientation might have 
been beneficial in the short term but it also left Middle Eastern Americans ‘at the margins of the 
civil rights movement and with little collective social or political force’ (2009: 184), and he 
suggests that there is a new politics afoot. Alinejad, similarly, mentions that the second-
generation Iranian-Americans she encountered ‘stake personal claims to an anti-racist non-
whiteness defined by the multiple racisms they observe and encounter’ (2010: 137), even if this 
is often a ‘post-political’ stance. In a similar vein, the sociologist Neda Maghbouleh's (2017) 
exploration of the identities of young Iranian-Americans reveals the ‘limits of whiteness’, as she 
puts it. This immigrant group hovers on the cusp of racial invisibility as defined by law and their 
everyday hyper-visibility. While the US context - and the nature of debates about race - differs 
significantly from the British one, the UK’s Prevent15 policy echoes some of the ‘extreme 
vetting’ procedures of the US and the rhetoric of English far-Right extremists such as Tommy 
Robinson focuses exclusively on the ‘Islamic threat’ engulfing Britain. Hence it is indeed 
possible that young Iranians in Britain will also start to rethink their position vis-a-vis other 
ethnic minority groups and feel less resolutely part of the white mainstream than before. 
Institutionally, too these US-based experiences suggest that in the longer term, the simple aim for 
recognition by the likes of BICDO might be more successful when aligned with other minorities 
in Britain than by an isolationist Iranian position. 
Yet, at the same time, an (re-)emerging rhetoric around Iranians as ‘Aryan’, originally blond and 
blue-eyed, a crudely racist position, is being revived by people like Jason Reza Jorjani of the Alt-
                                                            
15 The key strand of the UK government’s counter‐extremism policy, CONTEST. For research on the Islamophobic 
nature of this policy, see inter alia Novelli 2017; Open Society 2016; MCB 2015. 
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Right16 and Reza Aslan, both public figures in the US. This has, for the moment, been mainly 
conducted in English (not Persian), suggesting that context, both social and political, is key to 
such dynamics and debates about identity. The emerging politics around Iranian-American 
identity has been directly addressed by a group of US-based Iranian feminist scholars, who 
argued in 2017 that: 
We aim to recognize that while Iranian-Americans have much more work to do to make 
themselves allies and co-conspirators with other people of color, especially to black 
people — in their home countries and in the diaspora — we also recognize that most 
Iranian-Americans know that their lived experiences do not align with the European-
descended counterparts Spencer et al. claim as their ancestors, and that constructions of 
race and uses of racism fuel the brutal power structures and institutions that serve to 
exploit people of color, Iranians included. We believe that those of us with access to 
institutions of higher education and other forms of privilege that come from access to 
education have a duty to directly confront expressions and beliefs in, and collusion with, 
white supremacy.17 
 
In general, it might be said that the rhetoric of identity politics is more inflamed across the 
Atlantic. Yet the shift in the US by Iranians from a more ‘integrationist’ position – that clearly 
echoes the BICDO rhetoric – to a more politically nuanced understanding of the dynamics of 
racism and power gives us pause to wonder if something similar might emerge in the UK. Such a 
shift might occur as UK Iranians grow increasingly impatient with being misrepresented in 
public discourse despite their best efforts to fit in, and possibly also because of diasporic 
interactions with US Iranians through media and social networks. Importantly, it might also lead 
to the likes of BICDO and the secular middle-class generally to reflect more critically upon their 
marginalization of Iranian Shias. The US case indicates both the complexity but also changing 
nature of Iranian identifications in the on-going racialization of religious and ethnic groups. We 
might expect a similar discussion to become more pronounced in regard to Iranians in Britain 
over the next decade. Thus, while census data and inclusion in statistical evidence might be 
useful in and of itself, such discussions underscore a far more profound concern about the nature 
and extent of Iranian integration in both the US and in Britain. More comparative research would 
help tease out these debates further. 
                                                            
16 See for example: https://redice.tv/red-ice-radio/the-iranian-renaissance-and-aryan-imperium (accessed 20/12/17) 
17 Quoted from: http://www.chronicle.com/blogs/letters/notions-of-aryan-iranianness-must-be-rejected/ (accessed 
21/12/17) 
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Concluding remarks 
Of course, there are many Iranian diasporans who practice Shia Islam to varying degrees of piety 
and participate in a range of social, cultural and political activities directly tied to their 
religiosity. Furthermore, Iranian diasporic Shiism, and indeed the Iranian diaspora itself, must be 
viewed in the context of emerging political and ethno-religious alliances that make it difficult to 
sharply distinguish between secular/religious, Iranian/non-Iranian, local/global positions – one 
example being the ‘Don’t Attack Iran’ campaign of the Stop the War Coalition that brought 
together activists from a range of backgrounds. That said, the theme of Shia marginalization by 
secular, middle-class discourses and practices is a powerful one that animates Iranian diasporic 
social relations to a considerable degree. In this context, as we have argued, the ways in which 
the idea of integration works at various levels warrants special attention. We have been 
concerned here with Britain’s policies and politics of integration, which we have argued must be 
implicated for their role in creating a specific culture of integration among UK Iranians. This is a 
culture that equates integration with a neo-liberal, West-centric understanding of success while 
devaluing Shia cultures and identities, and Islam in general. Awareness of these processes 
becomes all the more important when very often, as we saw above, Iranians blame themselves 
for failing to live up to the standards of integration, without making any demands on the state – 
in fact they usually see the state as righteous and defend its actions.  
Related to this, regardless of their stated aims and intentions, dominant policies and discourses of 
integration take on a new life as a result of interacting with minority populations. That is, they 
are taken up and deployed in different ways according to the specific dynamics of a given 
community. They thus produce unintended social and cultural effects. Among middle-class 
Iranians, as we have seen, ‘integration’ is approached primarily in cultural terms and inextricably 
linked with the wide acceptance of Western middle-class logics on the one hand and the 
marginalization of Islam in favour of pre-Islamic Persia on the other. As such, the imperative to 
integrate, which on the face of it is benign and in keeping with national policy, in reality ends up 
marginalizing Iranian Shias. Ultimately, there are many possible routes to integration, and it is 
therefore quite problematic that some Iranian organizations, such as BICDO, as the self-
appointed voice of all Iranians, choose a very class-biased and self-denying position rather than 
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one of solidarity with other minority groups. However, we also presented evidence from the US 
that suggests dynamics in this regard could be about to change. 
In sum, we have been concerned to underscore the fact that immigrants and ethnic minorities 
experience the state’s discourses and policies of integration not in isolation and not in a 
straightforward manner; they experience them as a complex and historically-cumulative field of 
policy that constantly addresses them, even as some, such as secular Iranians, are wilfully 
ignored. Thus, usage of terms like ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘pathways to citizenship’ must be 
adequately problematized. When Meer and Modood (2014: 667), for example, argue that British 
multiculturalism has historically rejected ‘assimilation’ and led to the positive recognition of 
minorities, they do not sufficiently appreciate the lived daily challenges that migrants/minorities 
face as a result of being the object of multiculturalist policies; being constantly interpellated and 
transformed by them; having to live up to or negotiate them. Therefore, in spite of what the 
government and some academics say, in settings such as the Iranian one assimilationist and 
marginalizing tendencies continue to be extremely strong and shape cultural and social relations, 
all in the name of integration.  
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